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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Poliovirus  importations  into  polio-free  countries  represent  a  major  concern  during  the  ﬁnal  phases  of
global eradication  of  wild polioviruses  (WPVs).  We  extend  dynamic  transmission  models  to demonstrate
the  dynamics  of  population  immunity  out  through  2020  for three  countries  that  only  used inactivated
poliovirus  vaccine  (IPV)  for routine  immunization:  the  US,  Israel,  and  The  Netherlands.  For each  country,
we  explore  the  vulnerability  to re-established  transmission  following  an  importation  for each  poliovirus
serotype,  including  the  impact  of  immunization  choices  following  the  serotype  1 WPV  importation  that
occurred  in 2013  in Israel.  As  population  immunity  declines  below  the threshold  required  to  prevent
transmission,  countries  become  at risk  for re-established  transmission.  Although  importations  repre-
sent  stochastic  events  that countries  cannot  fully  control  because  people  cross borders  and  polioviruses
mainly  cause  asymptomatic  infections,  countries  can  ensure  that  any  importations  die out.  Our  results
suggest  that the  general  US  population  will  remain  above  the threshold  for transmission  through  2020.  In
contrast,  Israel  became  vulnerable  to re-established  transmission  of  importations  of  live polioviruses  by
the late  2000s.  In  Israel,  the  recent  WPV  importation  and  outbreak  response  use of bivalent  oral  poliovirus
vaccine  (bOPV)  eliminated  the  vulnerability  to  an  importation  of  poliovirus  serotypes  1  and  3 for  several
years,  but  not  serotype  2. The  Netherlands  experienced  a serotype  1 WPV  outbreak  in 1992–1993 and
became  vulnerable  to re-established  transmission  in  religious  communities  with  low  vaccine  acceptance
around the  year  2000,  although  the  general  population  remains  well-protected  from  widespread  trans-
mission.  All countries  should  invest  in  active  management  of  population  immunity  to avoid  the  potential
circulation  of  imported  live  polioviruses.  IPV-using  countries  may  wish  to consider  prevention  opportu-
nities  and/or  ensure  preparedness  for  response.  Countries  currently  using  a  sequential  IPV/OPV  schedule
should  continue  to use  all licensed  OPV  serotypes  until  global  OPV  cessation  to minimize  vulnerability
to  circulation  of  imported  polioviruses.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
The risk of infectious agents crossing international borders
otivates global disease coordination and management efforts,
ncluding the Global Polio Eradication Initiative [1]. As long as wild
olioviruses (WPVs) circulate anywhere, they pose some risk of
mportation (i.e., crossing the border) into all countries. Not surpris-
ngly, once countries succeed in stopping endemic (i.e., indigenous)
PV  transmission (i.e., national elimination) and become “polio
ree,” their concerns about WPVs primarily turn to potential
∗ Corresponding author at: Kid Risk, Inc., 10524 Moss Park Rd., Ste. 204-364,
rlando, FL 32832, USA. Tel.: +1 617 680 2836.
E-mail address: kimt@kidrisk.org (K.M. Thompson).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.02.013
264-410X/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unlicense  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
importations. Detection of an importation typically depends on the
Global Polio Laboratory Network ﬁnding paralytic cases, and conse-
quently WPV  importations that do not result in identiﬁed paralytic
cases go unnoticed. Notable exceptions occurred with the detec-
tion of asymptomatic WPV  serotype 1 (WPV1) transmission in 2013
by the extensive Israeli environmental surveillance system, which
allowed Israel to respond to the circulation and successfully pre-
vent cases [2–4], and similar detection and response to the same
WPV1 in Egypt [5].
Recently, the World Health Organization focused on importa-
tions as a primary concern for the polio endgame and established
temporary recommendations for international travel immuniza-
tion to reduce the international spread of poliovirus [6]. While
efforts to increase the immunity of individual international travel-
ers may  reduce the number of importation events, this approach
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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oes not eliminate the risk altogether and focuses only on the
ationally less-controllable part of the risk of re-established
ransmission. In addition to the importation event (e.g., WPV  enter-
ng the population), the risk of re-established transmission of
n imported WPV  depends on the vulnerability of the popula-
ion receiving the imported virus to sustain transmission, which
epends on its population immunity to poliovirus transmission [7].
hus, while countries cannot easily control all of the border cross-
ngs that may  lead to importation events [8,9], particularly for a
isease that primarily spreads asymptomatically, national immu-
ization decisions determine population immunity to transmission
nd thus the overall national risk of re-established transmission of
mported polioviruses [7].
Population immunity to transmission represents the aggrega-
ion of the immunity of all individuals within a population, and
t changes over time with demographic changes (i.e., births of
mmunologically-naïve individuals, deaths of immune individuals,
nd immigration) and factors that impact individual immunity (i.e.,
mmunization, infection, and waning of antibodies) [7]. Models
f population immunity must consider all dynamic inputs, and
lso account for the different types of immunological protection
rovided by oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) and inactivated
oliovirus vaccine (IPV) [7]. As a live, attenuated virus, OPV causes
nfections in vaccine recipients who can spread their infections to
ffectively immunize contacts or boost their immunity, providing
eneﬁts beyond the vaccine recipient. However, OPV comes with
 small risk of vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) [10], and
PV-using populations with low immunity levels can support sus-
ained transmission of OPV-related viruses that evolve to become
irculating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs), which behave
ike WPVs [10,11]. For serotype 2, cVDPVs now represent the pri-
ary importation risk given the absence of any serotype 2 WPV
ince 2000 [8]. In contrast to OPV, IPV provides protection only to
accine recipients and it does not come with VAPP or cVDPV risks.
owever, IPV does not protect as well as OPV against asymptomatic
ntestinal infections or fecal-oral transmission [12,13]. After suc-
essful immunization with IPV or recovery from an infection with
 live poliovirus (LPV, i.e., WPV, cVPDV, OPV, or OPV-related virus)
f a speciﬁc serotype, individuals beneﬁt from permanent homo-
ypic protection from paralysis, but they can get re-infected and
articipate asymptomatically in homotypic transmission to some
egree [12–15].
Fig. 1 summarizes the number of calendar years that countries
eported one or more WPV  or cVDPV cases during 2000–2014 and
emonstrates ongoing national challenges associated with main-
aining high population immunity. Social disruptions appear to
epresent a signiﬁcant risk factor (e.g., Syria, Iraq), which sug-
ests that areas with social unrest (e.g., Somalia, Pakistan, and
ore recently, Ukraine, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone) may  warrant
articular attention. Full protection from paralytic polio requires
mmunity for all three poliovirus serotypes. Both IPV and trivalent
PV (tOPV) currently used for routine immunization (RI) contain all
hree serotypes, but countries can use bivalent OPV (bOPV, contain-
ng serotypes 1 and 3) and monovalent OPV (mOPV) formulations
or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) [8,16]. Immuniza-
ion choices imply trade-offs [16], and current discussions about
he polio endgame lead to questions about the dynamics of coor-
inated global OPV cessation and the role of IPV with respect to
anaging population immunity [17–20]. Current plans include
lobally-coordinated cessation of serotype-2 containing OPV (i.e.,
PV2 cessation) ﬁrst, followed by globally-coordinated OPV ces-
ation of serotypes 1 and 3 (i.e., OPV1&3 cessation) [21]. The GPEI
dentiﬁed 6 criteria as prerequisites to OPV2 cessation [21], and
e highlighted the importance of assuring high enough popula-
ion immunity at the time of OPV2 using sufﬁcient tOPV SIAs as an
dditional prerequisite to the safe withdrawal of OPV2 [16]. 33 (2015) 1568–1577 1569
Models characterizing the dynamics of poliovirus transmission
and population immunity demonstrate the importance of main-
taining high population immunity to achieve WPV  eradication
and successfully stop OPV use [15,17–20,22,23]. Prior modeling
emphasizes that OPV-using countries must keep their population
immunity sufﬁciently above the threshold required to prevent
transmission in order to prevent cVDPV emergences prior to and
after OPV cessation [17–20]. Thus, OPV-using countries should use
tOPV with sufﬁciently high coverage (i.e., RI with SIAs as needed)
up until the point of OPV2 cessation, at which point they should
switch to bOPV and again maintain high coverage to ensure high
population immunity until OPV1&3 cessation [16–20]. Countries
should recognize that their vaccine choices will also affect their
probabilities of undetected LPV circulation after apparent interrup-
tion of transmission [24]. The prior models focused on OPV-using
countries [16–20]. However, with all countries at risk for importa-
tions from any circulating WPVs or cVDPVs [8], we  recognize the
importance of considering national vulnerability to re-established
transmission following a LPV importation into IPV-only using
countries.
2. Methods
We extend our prior modeling [4,15,17–20,22–24] to char-
acterize vulnerability to re-established transmission and options
that IPV-only using countries may  consider to reduce or elim-
inate their vulnerability (see Appendix A). Brieﬂy, the model
tracks the population in different immunity states as a result of
births, deaths, immigration, immunization, infection, and waning.
We developed generic model inputs for human immunological
responses to polioviruses and poliovirus transmission charac-
teristics by serotype that remain constant across all modeled
situations (i.e., immunity state inputs for susceptibility, infectious-
ness, and duration of the latent and infectious periods, kinetics
of waning immunity and OPV virus evolution (i.e., to become
cVDPVs following sufﬁcient sustained transmission), and rela-
tive poliovirus transmissibility and paralysis-to-infection ratios
by serotype) based on an extensive expert review and elicita-
tion process [12,13,15]. We calibrated the model inputs across
ten diverse epidemiological situations (i.e., geographic areas with
different conditions and experiences with WPVs and cVDPVs),
which used situation-speciﬁc appropriate inputs for population,
historical RI and SIA vaccination, basic reproductive number (R0),
seasonality, and relative proportion of overall (i.e., fecal-oral
and oropharyngeal) transmissions that occur via the oropharyn-
geal route (poro). The calibration process focused on ensuring
that the model inputs yielded behavior and estimates consis-
tent with the actual reported WPV  and/or cVDPV incidence by
age, the actual apparent timing of WPV  die-out (where appro-
priate), the absence or emergence of cVDPVs, and available data
on secondary OPV transmission and children missed by SIAs
[4,15,17–20,22–24]. The model tracks viral transmission, includ-
ing asymptomatic infections in individuals with prior immunity,
and explicitly recognizes that relative susceptibility to infec-
tion and relative infectiousness over time determine the relative
potential contribution to transmission for individuals in each
immunity state [7,15]. Aggregating the proportions of individuals
in each immunity state, their potential contribution to transmis-
sion, and considering the mixing properties for different age groups
and subpopulations in the model, we  characterize population
immunity to poliovirus transmission by computing the age-
and-subpopulation-mixing-adjusted effective immune proportion
(EIPM) [20]. We  also characterize the seasonally-varying immunity
threshold EIP* = (1 − 1/R0) above which infections eventually die
out [20].
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mmunity to stop or prevent transmission, (a) including years with endemic circu
ecoming polio-free. Based on the summary table for 2000–2012 data [8] with upd
.1. US model
Our prior analyses for the US suggested that while WPV  or
VDPV importations into a pocket of under-vaccinated individ-
als might lead to limited transmission [25], they would not likely
ead to re-established transmission in the general population [22].
ur current model explicitly accounts for both fecal-oral and orop-
aryngeal transmission, which IPV use affects differentially [15].
iven the evidence that IPV protects well against participation in
ropharyngeal transmission, but not as well against participation in
ecal-oral transmission [12,13], we explore the reference case (RC)
f continued IPV-only immunization and one different assumption
bout the proportion of transmissions via the oropharyngeal route
poro), which determines the relative importance of oropharyngeal
ransmission on population immunity without changing the overall
0 assumption [15]..2. Israel model
For Israel, our prior analysis explored the historical transmis-
ion of WPVs and the impacts of the 2013 WPV1 importation ande paralytic polio cases caused by a WPV  or cVDPV indicating insufﬁcient population
 and (b) including only years with circulation of cVDPVs* or imported WPV  after
ata for 2013 and 2014 [1].
immunization response on population immunity for serotype 1
through 2015 [4]. The model divides the Israeli population geo-
graphically into the Southern district and the rest of Israel and
socially into Jews and non-Jews for each geographic area (i.e., 4
preferentially-mixing subpopulations). Most of the transmission
of the 2013 WPV1 occurred in the Southern district, particu-
larly among the non-Jews [4], but some limited transmission also
occurred in the rest of Israel. Based on the epidemiology of the out-
break that focused on Bedouin communities with below-average
hygiene standards, we  characterize a somewhat higher R0 (i.e., of
6 vs. 5 elsewhere in Israel) and lower poro (i.e., 0.6 vs. 0.7 else-
where) for the non-Jewish subpopulation in the Southern district
[2,26]. The RC includes the recent immunization response to the
actual 2013 signal of a WPV1 detected by the Israeli environmental
surveillance system [4]. We extend the model through 2020 and
for all 3 serotypes. We  consider retrospectively several hypothet-
ical importations of WPV1, WPV3, or cVDPV2 with high and low
seasonality and not outbreak response to explore the timing of vul-
nerability to re-established transmission. With some countries that
currently use IPV/OPV sequential schedules possibly considering
use of IPV-only, we explore the counterfactual of Israel historically
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ot switching to IPV-only RI (i.e., continued sequential IPV/OPV).
e also modeled prospective options with hypothetical introduc-
ions of WPV1, WPV3, or cVDPV2, for which we  assumed the RC
ncludes continued use of 2 bOPV doses in RI through the end of
he time horizon. We  considered the reality that Israel could stop
sing bOPV at any time (i.e., 2 bOPV doses from 2014 with cessa-
ion on indicated date) [4]. We  also considered the impact of Israel
sing tOPV instead of bOPV in RI starting on January 1, 2015 (i.e.,
witch to tOPV in 2015 with OPV cessation on indicated date) to
emonstrate the impact of vaccine choices.
.3. The Netherlands model
The Netherlands model includes two subpopulations (i.e., the
rthodox reformed communities of about 300,000 people at the
ime of the 1992–1993 outbreak, and the general Dutch population)
15]. For the general population, we assumed RI coverage with 3 or
ore IPV doses decreased from 97% 1994 [15] to about 95% from
003 forward [27]. For the orthodox reformed communities, we  use
 best estimate of 40% relative coverage compared to the general
opulation, and given uncertainty we consider a range of 20–60%
rom 1994 forward.
. Results
Fig. 2 shows the US population immunity (i.e., EIPM) and the
hreshold (i.e., EIP*) for each serotype from 1995 through 2020 for
he RC. For each serotype, EIPM > EIP*, which suggests no vulner-
bility to re-established poliovirus transmission in the US general
opulation, even after a long period of IPV-only RI, similar to prior
tudies [22,25]. Thus, although real heterogeneity in the US implies
ome risk of limited localized transmission of imported LPVs within
ome subpopulations with much lower than average RI coverage
e.g., rural clusters of religious groups that object to vaccination
r more urban upper-income communities that refuse vaccina-
ion based on personal beliefs) [22,25], re-established transmission
n the general population appears unlikely based on projected
overage. Fig. 2 further highlights that sustained high population
mmunity provided by IPV depends on the realistic assumption
hat poliovirus transmission in the US primarily occurs via orop-
aryngeal contact [12–15]. If we unrealistically increase the relative
mportance of fecal-oral transmission (i.e., decrease poro from 0.8
n the RC to 0.6), then population immunity would drop below
he threshold within the next few years for serotype 1 and creep
owards the threshold for serotypes 2 and 3 (for which we  assume
ower values for R0 [15]. and thus lower thresholds). This decline in
opulation immunity would occur despite continued high RI cov-
rage and no change in the assumed absolute transmissibility of
olioviruses (i.e., same R0), and it relates to the limited impact of IPV
n fecal-oral transmission. While we believe hygiene and sanitation
evels remain high in most places in the US, Fig. 2 suggests that any
lusters of people living in sub-optimal hygiene conditions in the
S could see some spread despite high RI coverage with IPV. Simi-
arly, populations using IPV-only with more fecal-oral transmission
n other countries may  become vulnerable to re-established trans-
ission of WPVs or cVDPVs more quickly over time, even with
ustained high RI coverage.
South Israel provides an example of conditions conducive to re-
stablished transmission. Fig. 3 shows how population immunity
hanged for the RC in Israel for each serotype for 2005–2014 and
uggests that extension of the IPV/OPV sequential schedule would
ave maintained population immunity high enough to prevent
srael from becoming vulnerable to re-established transmission fol-
owing any WPV  or cVDPV importations. As shown in Fig. 3a–c,
he population immunity for the RC for each serotype starts to 33 (2015) 1568–1577 1571
decrease and drops to a level consistently below the EIP*, although
this occurs at different times for each serotype, with increases in
population immunity for serotypes 1 and 3 starting in 2013 due
to the WPV1 importation and subsequent bOPV use. Fig. 3 sug-
gests that population immunity dropped below the thresholds and
exposed Israel to the possibility of limited, low-level transmission
in the high season as early as 2007, 2008, and 2006, for serotypes
1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Table 1 shows how many of the four subpopulations in the
Israel model participated in transmission and the overall transmis-
sion behavior in the model following hypothetical introductions
of imported WPV1, WPV3, and cVDPV2. In the context of the
results shown in Fig. 3, the results in the top of Table 1 suggest
that the development of outbreaks and re-established transmis-
sion requires an extended period of population immunity below
the threshold, with re-established transmission in the general pop-
ulation shown in Table 1 (top) possible in Israel for importations as
early as 2009, 2012, and 2010 for serotypes 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Fig. 4a shows the population immunity for serotype 1 for the RC
and for several alternative prospective dates for stopping serotype
1 OPV use, which demonstrates that population immunity begins
declining as soon as use of OPV stops, even with high IPV cover-
age. Fig. 4b–d shows the population immunity of the RC modeled
prospectively for serotypes 1, 2, and 3, respectively, along with sev-
eral options for homotypic OPV cessation dates and considering the
switch from bOPV to tOPV in January 2015 until the homotypic OPV
cessation date indicated. Table 1 (bottom) indicates the degree of
spread of imported WPV1, WPV3, or cVDPV2 for different prospec-
tive hypothetical introduction times during 2015–2020. The model
suggests that continued OPV use would prevent any importation of
the included OPV serotypes (i.e., all serotypes for tOPV, serotypes
1 and 3 for bOPV) from spreading. For the RC, as shown in the ret-
rospective analysis (Table 1, top) a cVDPV2 imported after 2012
leads to widespread transmission, so the prospective introduction
in November 2015 takes off. If Israel decided to use tOPV instead
of bOPV from January 2015 until global OPV2 cessation, then the
model suggests this would prevent re-established serotype 2 trans-
mission associated with a November 2015 importation. The model
results also suggest that Israel might again become vulnerable to a
WPV1 importation 3 years after discontinued bOPV use (i.e., the
February 2017 importation dies-out the same year whereas the
February 2019 importation spreads and leads to sustained trans-
mission in the following year). Similarly, discontinued bOPV use
would allow transmission of a WPV3 importation 4 years after
discontinued bOPV use.
Fig. 5 shows the expected population immunity in The
Netherlands through 2020. Unlike the US model, we explicitly
characterized a subpopulation of orthodox reformed communities
with known low vaccine acceptance, because these communities
represent a signiﬁcant proportion of the population and they
historically experienced poliovirus outbreaks in 1978 [28] and
1992–1993 [29] and a measles outbreak as recently as 2013 [30].
Unlike the under-vaccinated Amish communities in the US, the
Dutch orthodox reformed communities remain in relatively close
geographic proximity in addition to their social clustering [31]. Also
unlike the US, which used OPV-only for RI for several decades before
switching to an IPV/OPV sequential schedule for a few years and
then to IPV-only RI in 2000 [32], The Netherlands used an IPV-only
RI schedule since it introduced poliovirus vaccination in the 1950s
[33], which implies lower population immunity to transmission
in the Dutch general population. The presence of a preferentially-
mixing subpopulation with very low RI coverage implies that a
WPV  or cVDPV of any serotype can circulate in this subpopula-
tion and therefore in The Netherlands. Fig. 5a and b shows that
for serotypes 1 and 2, which have not circulated widely since at
least 1978, population immunity appears well below the threshold
1572 K.M. Thompson et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 1568–1577
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f  transmissions via the oropharyngeal route (poro = 0.6).
s a result of the low coverage in the orthodox reformed com-
unities and absence of natural immunity from an outbreak. This
mplies that a WPV  or cVDPV of these serotypes could establish
idespread transmission if introduced into the orthodox reformed
ommunities. For serotype 3, population immunity remains some-
hat higher due to the WPV3 outbreak in these communities in
992–1993, but it also decreases below the threshold at a rate
hat depends on the subpopulation coverage assumptions (Fig. 5c).
ig. 5d provides the breakdown of population immunity for the
eneral population, which remains above the threshold, and for to the threshold (EIP*) from 1995 forward, and for hypothetically lower proportion
the subpopulation, which does not (similar breakdowns for the
other two  serotypes not shown). Fig. 5d suggests that although a
WPV  or cVDPV introduced in The Netherlands could circulate in the
orthodox reformed communities, the general population remains
well-protected and would most likely not sustain extensive re-
established transmission (similar to the US, Fig. 2). Although the
orthodox communities may  beneﬁt to some extent from high pop-
ulation immunity in the general population, viruses may  or may  not
take off depending on chance and the timing and place of introduc-
tion [25]. Our results overall suggest high vulnerability to a WPV
K.M. Thompson et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 1568–1577 1573
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PV-using high-income countries.
. Discussion
Maintaining high population immunity to poliovirus trans-
ission should represent a priority for all countries due to the
mportation risk of WPVs or cVDPVs. Most OPV-using countries
robably face a more signiﬁcant risk of creating a domestic cVDPV
rior to or after OPV cessation than from importation of a cVDPV,
nd for these countries we emphasize that national risks of cVDPV
reation alone should motivate efforts to maintain high population
mmunity throughout the polio endgame [4,15,17–20,22,23]. How-
ver, IPV-only using countries should recognize that they still face
mportation risks and consider opportunities to decrease their risks,IP*) and if Israel hypothetically had maintained an IPV/OPV sequential schedule.
including establishing sensitive environmental surveillance and
ensuring access to OPV for any needed outbreak response [34,35].
With successful cessation of WPV1 circulation in Israel conﬁrmed,
Israel would likely beneﬁt from switching from the use of bOPV to
tOPV for its two RI OPV doses starting in early 2015 until the time
of coordinated global OPV2 cessation to maximize its serotype 2
population immunity. However, such a strategy could prove chal-
lenging from a policy perspective, because this would introduce
serotype 2 LPV into Israel in the absence of an already circulating
cVDPV2. Using tOPV now would provide Israel with some insur-
ance such that any importations of cVDPV2s from other countries,
which Israel cannot fully control, will not re-establish transmission
and necessitate another outbreak response. However, Israel could
also decide to accept the low risk of a cVDPV2 importation and focus
on preparedness instead of prevention. Prior to introducing tOPV
1574 K.M. Thompson et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 1568–1577
Fig. 4. Population immunity and the impacts of using tOPV or bOPV in RI after 2014 in Israel.
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Fig. 5. Overall population immunity in The Netherlands by serotype for the RC compared to the threshold (EIP*) from 1990 forward for all 3 serotypes for different assumptions
(i.e.,  20%, 40%, and 60%) of relative coverage in the orthodox reformed communities (compared to the general population) and for type 1 the breakdown of population immunity
for  the orthodox reformed communities and general population separately.
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Table 1
Vulnerability to re-established transmission in Israel following a hypothetical importation of WPV1, WPV3, or cVDPV2 between 2008 and 2012 (retrospective) and between
2015  and 2020 (prospective) for different immunization scenarios and resulting transmission behavior of the imported virus within the 4 modeled subpopulations in the
absence of further outbreak response measures.
Timing of
introduction
Immunization
assumptions
scenario
Number of subpopulations affected
(out of 4) after virus introduction
indicated
Transmission behavior of introduced
virus
WPV1 cVDPV2 WPV3 WPV1 cVDPV2 WPV3
Retrospective scenarios
Feb 9, 2008 Reference case (RC) 4 1 1 Low level in 2008,
re-established in 2009
Die-out in 2008 Die-out in 2008
Feb  9, 2009 Reference case 4 1 2 Re-established in 2009 Low level in 2009,
re-established in 2010
Low level in 2009,
re-established in 2010
Feb  9, 2010 Reference case 4 1 3 Re-established in 2010 Re-established in 2010 Low level in 2010,
re-established in 2011
Feb  9, 2011 Reference case 4 2 3 Re-established in 2011 Re-established in 2011 Low level in 2011,
re-established in 2012
Aug  7, 2011 Reference case 4 3 1 Low level in 2011,
re-established in 2012
Low level in 2011,
re-established in 2012
Die-out in 2011
Feb  9, 2012 Reference case 4 3 3 Re-established in 2012 Re-established in 2012 Low level in 2012,
re-established in 2013
Aug  7, 2012 Reference case 4 4 1 Low level in 2012,
re-established in 2013
Low level in 2012,
re-established in 2013
Die-out in 2012
Any  time Continued sequential
IPV/OPV
0 0 0 No spread No spread No spread
Prospective scenarios
Nov 1, 2015 Reference case 0 4 0 No spread Low level in 2016,
re-established in 2017
No spread
Feb  9, 2017‘ 2 bOPV doses from
2014 with bOPV
cessation in Oct 2015
1 4 1 Die-out in 2017 Low level in 2017,
re-established in 2018
Die-out in 2017
Feb  9, 2019 2 bOPV doses from
2014 with bOPV
cessation in Oct 2015
3 4 1 Low level in 2019,
re-established in 2020
Low level in 2019,
re-established in 2020
Die-out in 2019
Nov  1, 2015 Switch to tOPV in Jan
2015
0  0 0 No spread No spread No spread
Feb  9, 2017 Switch to tOPV in Jan
2015 with tOPV
cessation in Apr 2016
1 1 1 Die-out in 2017 Die-out in 2017 Die-out in 2017
Feb  9, 2019 Switch to tOPV in Jan
2015 with tOPV
cessation in Apr 2016
1 1 1 Low level in 2019,
re-established in 2021*
Low level in 2019,
re-established in 2021*
Die-out in 2019
Feb  9, 2019 Switch to tOPV in Jan
2015, switch back to
bOPV in Apr 2016 with
OPV cessation in Apr
2019
1  1 1 Die-out in 2019 Low level in 2019,
re-established in 2021*
Die-out in 2019
Abbreviations:  bOPV, bivalent types 1 and 3 oral poliovirus vaccine; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; PV1,2,3, poliovirus type 1, 2, or 3, respectively; tOPV, trivalent oral
poliovirus vaccine.
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a* Possible re-establishment in 2021 (outside the analytical time frame) based on
n RI, Israeli policy makers may  want to consider further modeling
f the actual options, which may  include SIAs or expanded target
ges in RI not addressed here.
Our results suggest that countries using or considering an
PV/OPV sequential schedule should continue to use the global
ormulation of OPV with all serotypes allowable up until the
ime of coordinated OPV cessation by serotype occurs (e.g., tOPV
ow, bOPV after OPV2 cessation). Countries should recognize
hat the adoption of an IPV-only immunization schedule may
ake some populations vulnerable to re-established transmission
ollowing LPV importations, even with relatively high coverage,
articularly in the context of hygiene and sanitation conditions
hat favor fecal-oral transmission. Similarly, substitution of IPV
or OPV doses in RI may  lead to reductions in overall population
mmunity and countries should consider this as they manage
heir risks in the polio endgame [36]. Countries considering a
witch from IPV/OPV use to IPV-only to eliminate VAPP should
eigh the expected small reduction in VAPP cases [37] against
he risk of outbreaks of imported WPV  or cVDPV in the context of
ny under-vaccinated subpopulations or subpopulation that mayved trend.
support fecal-oral poliovirus transmission. All countries should
recognize the importance of not “demonizing” OPV when making
changes in national immunization policy in case OPV becomes
needed for outbreak response during the endgame.
The introduction of imported viruses into clusters of suscepti-
ble individuals represents a high risk, and countries should explore
opportunities to potentially increase population immunity in these
groups to the extent possible and monitor these groups for indi-
cations of transmission throughout the endgame. Focusing on
prevention and risk management will represent an important strat-
egy to successfully achieve WPV  eradication and successful OPV
cessation, but it may  imply greater than currently anticipated
demands for tOPV in the short term. Failing to understand and man-
age population immunity in all countries will most likely continue
to delay polio eradication goals, increase the needs for vaccine and
other resources for outbreak response, and increase overall costs.Conﬂict of interest statement
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